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A Grim Prognosis? The Collateral Source
Rule in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice
Actions After the Affordable Care Act
Ryan Hart*
ABSTRACT

Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA") in 2010, the percentage of individuals carrying health insurance
An unintended
in the United States has consistently increased.
consequence of the ACA is that it has undermined the historical
justification of the collateral source rule. The collateral source rule,
which precludes a defendant from introducing evidence of a plaintiffs
insurance coverage, has persisted for nearly 150 years primarily because
insurance coverage was not the ubiquitous product that it is today.
In Pennsylvania, the intersection of the ACA and the collateral
source rule has especially affected the medical malpractice field. An
increasing number of insured plaintiffs in Pennsylvania medical
malpractice lawsuits are able to collect twice for their future medical
expenses-once when their heath insurance provider pays the plaintiffs'
medical bills, and again when defendants pay these same bills.
The collateral source rule is not only incongruous with the ACA,
but it also conflicts with state legislation, such as the Medical Care
Availability and Reduction of Error Act ("MCARE Act"). The MCARE
Act demonstrates a clear public policy reflecting the legislature's desire
to reduce physicians' medical malpractice liability premiums and to
retain competent physicians in the Commonwealth. The continuance of
the collateral source rule, and its perpetuation of double recoveries, is
directly at odds with such public policy.
This Comment discusses the evolution of the collateral source rule
in Pennsylvania and reviews the seminal cases that have shaped the
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, 2017. I
would first like to thank Frank Straub, Leslie Dalton, Beth Ramos, Tori Buzzelli, and
Professor Christopher French for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank my
wife, Alison, for her love and support and for otherwise being a great person. Lastly, I
would like to thank my father for teaching me the value of hard work and for guiding me
to the conclusion that I am not cut out for manual labor.
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rule's application in medical malpractice proceedings. Additionally, this
Comment explains how state legislation, primarily the MCARE Act,
altered the collateral source rule's function. Finally, this Comment
presents three practical avenues by which the Commonwealth can amend
or abrogate the collateral source rule that are both consistent with
existing public policy and protective of injured plaintiffs.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

With the reaffirmation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act' ("ACA") in King v. Burwell,2 the individual mandate' of health

1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
2. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
3. See I.R.C. § 5000A (2010) (requiring individuals to obtain minimum essential
coverage with limited exceptions).
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4
insurance appears to be here to stay for the time being. The Supreme
Court's King decision preserved the widespread availability of healthcare
in the United States, and, in doing so, has brought considerable attention
5
to an unintended area of the law-the collateral source rule. More
specifically, the ACA has greatly affected the way in which the collateral
source rule is viewed in the medical malpractice field. Pennsylvania's
evidentiary procedures and substantive law governing the medical
malpractice field have failed to keep up with new state and federal
legislation, and, as a result, place extensive financial burdens on
physicians in the Commonwealth.6 This failure is particularly evident
with regard to the collateral source rule.
When a physician is negligent in treating a patient, the physician
may be liable to the patient based on a medical malpractice cause of
action. When the patient brings suit against the physician, not only will
the patient present evidence of the physician's negligence, but she will
also present to the jury evidence of the damages sustained as a result of
the physician's negligence. Such damages will likely be composed of
past damages-those damages incurred up to the time of the lawsuit7-as
well as future damages-those damages expected to be incurred after the
conclusion of the lawsuit.8 However, because of the persistence of the
collateral source rule, the jury will not be presented with evidence
indicating whether the patient carries health insurance to assist with the
payment of these medical expenses.9 The inequitable result of the

4. See generally Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate). President-elect Donald

Trump has argued both for and against a full repeal of the ACA, so it is difficult to
foresee the future of the law with any certainty. See Reed Abelson, Donald Trump Says
He May Keep Parts of Obama Health Care Act, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016),
http://nyti.ms/2ffHJPFD.
5. See generally Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The CollateralSource Rule in
the Face of Tort Reform, The Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43
McGEORGE L. REV. 965 (2012); Rebecca Levenson, Comment, Allocating the Costs of
Harm to Whom They are Due: Modifying the CollateralSource Rule After Health Care

Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (2012).
6. See Marcy L. McCullough, Comment, Prescribing Arbitration to Cure the
Common Crisis: Developing Legislation to Facilitate Arbitration as an Alternative to
Litigating Medical MalpracticeDisputes in Pennsylvania, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 810
(2006) (noting an increase in liability insurance premiums for Pennsylvania doctors).
7. See infra Part II.C.2.a.

8.

See infra Part II.C.2.b. The plaintiff will also likely seek damages for pain and

suffering, but, for the purposes of this Comment, such "non-economic" damages will not

be discussed in detail.
9.

See infra Part II.A. In fact, references to such collateral sources can result in a

mistrial. See, e.g., Larkin v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, No. 3409 EDA 2013, 2015 Pa.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3397, at *28 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2015) ("[D]efense counsel's
reference in opening statement to [plaintiffs] receipt of disability benefits was
undoubtedly improper and so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial. . . ."].
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physician's inability to introduce this evidence is that some plaintiffs in
medical malpractice proceedings are compensated for hundreds of
thousands of dollars of medical expenses, but only a tiny fraction of
these expenses are actually paid by the plaintiff in the form of policy
premiums and deductibles. o
This inequity, which originated at a time when health insurance was
not the ubiquitous product it is today," has become more prevalent with
the continued application of the ACA. Nowadays, more plaintiffs are
covered by health insurance when their medical malpractice claims
arise. 12 Additionally, the ACA prohibits insurance companies from
denying coverage for pre-existing conditions,13 which means that even
uninsured plaintiffs may obtain health insurance after they suffer harm at
the hands of a doctor.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss avenues by which the
Pennsylvania General Assembly can cure the inequities currently present
in the medical malpractice field. Medical malpractice liability insurance
carriers and the doctors that they insure are facing unnecessary,
heightened costs that can be lessened if certain actions are taken to
amend or abrogate the collateral source rule.1 4 Part II of this Comment
discusses the history of the collateral source rule in Pennsylvania, as well
as some of the seminal cases addressing the collateral source rule in
Pennsylvania medical malpractice actions.' 5
Additionally, Part II
introduces and analyzes recent Pennsylvania legislation, primarily the
MCARE Act,1 6 which amended the common law collateral source rule in
the Commonwealth.' 7
Most importantly, Part III of this Comment discusses and
recommends alternatives to the collateral source rule, many of which
have been employed in other states with great success." Ultimately, this
Comment recommends that the Pennsylvania General Assembly or
judiciary extend the holding and reasoning in Moorhead v. Crozer
Chester Medical Center 9 to future medical expenses. 20 Under such a
10. See ASPE OFFICE OF HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE
PREMIUMS FOR 2014, 11 (2013), http://bit.ly/2gf2Ajc (noting that the average premium
after tax credits for a family of four in Pennsylvania with an income of $50,000 is $282).
11. See infra Part ll.A.
12. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
14. See infra Part III.B-D.
15. See infra Part IIA-B, D.
16. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1303.101-910 (2014).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786 (Pa. 2001).
20. See infra Part III.D.
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system, future medical expenses awarded to plaintiffs in medical
malpractice lawsuits can be calculated by awarding the maximum yearly
21
out-of-pocket cost of obtaining insurance under the ACA.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The CollateralSource Rule in the Commonwealth
1.

Common Law History

The collateral source rule, which states that "payments from a
collateral source shall not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable
from the wrongdoer," 22 has a long and complex history in Pennsylvania
courts. In the 1871 case Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Keller,23
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Oswald Thompson discussed
24
a concept very similar to the contemporary collateral source rule. He
argued that it was necessary for a plaintiff to recover wrongful death
damages regardless of the monetary effect that the decedent's death had
on a surviving plaintiff, stating that:
[The failure to have such a system] would prevent compensation where the
survivors are absolutely benefited by the death, either as gainers by a
distribution of the property of the deceased, or by the riddance of a troublesome
charge. The controversies which would arise, if this wer$ghe rule, would be
repugnant and offensive to the sensibilities of every person.

The decedent's death in this case happened to bring financial gain to
the plaintiff, but Chief Justice Thompson recognized that the plaintiffs
26
fortuitous gain should not diminish the defendant's liability.
Although the prism through which the contemporary collateral
source rule is viewed has evolved, the rule's logic and practice remain
largely the same.27 Pennsylvania courts, as well as most courts in other

21.
22.

See id.
Johnson v. Beane, 664 A.2d 96, 100 (Pa. 1995).

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 920A(2) (AM.

LAW INST.

See also

RESTATEMENT

1979) ("Payments made to or benefits

conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's
liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.").
23. Pa. R.R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. 300 (1871).
24. Id. at 307.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. That is, more recent cases regarding the collateral source rule turn on the
availability of insurance as opposed to a windfall gained by property being passed to a
beneficiary or from the discharge of a debt, as was the case in Keller. For a slightly more
contemporary discussion of the collateral source rule in Pennsylvania, see Ridgeway v.
Sayre Elec. Co., 102 A. 123, 125 (Pa. 1917) ("[I]n an action for personal injuries, it has
been held uniformly that the defendant cannot show, either as a bar to the action or in
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jurisdictions, have uniformly upheld the collateral source rule 28 since its

inception. 29
One prevailing rationale for the collateral source rule's persistence
in Pennsylvania is the desire to prevent a defendant from benefitting
when a plaintiff was insured for the loss at issue. 3 0 Historically, this
made sense because the rate at which individuals across the country
carried health insurance was considerably lower when the collateral
source rule was introduced.3 1 In modem times, however, the significance
of this rationale fades, particularly within the realm of medical
malpractice. The ACA has made great strides in reducing the percentage
of the population without health care insurance.32 Today, the likelihood
that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is insured is less of a
chance occurrence and more of a statistical probability. 33
An oft-criticized aspect of the collateral source rule, and one that
has affected medical malpractice claims in Pennsylvania, is that the rule
favors windfall double recoveries for plaintiffs that carry insurance.34
With the dramatic increase in the percentage of individuals that carry

reduction in damages, that the injured person received, or is entitled to receive,
compensation for his injuries in the form of insurance or otherwise.").
28. See, e.g., Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 188 A.2d. 259, 259-62 (Pa. 1963);
Denardo v. Carneval, 444 A.2d 135, 140-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Deeds v. Univ. of Pa.
Med. Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
29. The collateral source rule was first adopted in the Supreme Court's Monticello
decision. See Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152, 155 (1855). The Court borrowed
from well-established English common law when it noted that "[an] insurer does not
stand in the relation of a joint trespasser, so that satisfaction accepted from him shall be a
release of others." Id.
30. See, e.g., Beechwoods Flying Serv., Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 476
A.2d 350, 353 (Pa. 1984) ("[The collateral source rule is] intended to prevent a
wrongdoer from taking advantage of the fortuitous existence of a collateral remedy.").
31. See CHRISTOPHER J. CONOVER, AM. ENTER. INST., AMERICAN HEALTH ECONOMY
ILLUSTRATED 88 (2012), http://bit.ly/2dlbTnR (indicating the uninsured rate has dropped
more than eighty percent over the last seventy years, but acknowledging many of the
uninsured rates prior to 1970 are estimates due to a lack of informational surveys from
that time period).
32. See Barack Obama, United States Health Care Reform: Progress to Date and
Next Steps, J. AM. MED. Ass'N, at E3 (published online July 11, 2016) (noting that since
the passage of the ACA, the uninsured rate has dropped by 43 percent). The ACA,
colloquially referred to as "Obamacare," was signed into law by President Obama, and
the potential bias of President Obama's article is not lost on the author of this Comment.
33. See Dan Diamond, Thanks, Obamacare: America's Uninsured Rate is Below
10% for First Time Ever, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://bit.1y/2fqsJi3 (reporting that
CDC data shows 90.8 percent of Americans currently have health insurance).
34. See Levenson, supra note 5, at 929-30 (detailing the arguments for and against
the collateral source rule, including potential double recoveries).
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health insurance, more plaintiffs are being paid twice for their injuriesonce by their health insurance carrier and once by the defendant.35
B.

An OriginalStep TowardFairCompensation Before the MCARE
Act: Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Center

In order to better understand the evolution of the collateral source
rule in medical malpractice actions and to identify the noteworthy issues
that double recoveries present, a discussion of relevant Pennsylvania case
law and legislation is necessary. This discussion will identify the major
policy concerns facing the medical malpractice field.
1.

Case Background

In Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Center,36 the plaintiff,
Catherine Baxter, was a patient at Crozer Chester Medical Center
("Crozer"), where she fell and was injured.37 Baxter, a Medicare
recipient, successfully sued Crozer for medical malpractice. 38 During the
trial, the court reserved for itself the issue of measuring the compensation
for Baxter's past medical expenses. 39 Baxter argued that she was entitled
to the reasonable value of her past medical expenses, calculated by the
sum of her medical bills, which was $108,668.31.40 Crozer, on the other
hand, claimed that Baxter was entitled only to the amount that Medicare
actually paid on her behalf, which totaled $12,167.40.41 Crozer asserted
that the difference between these two values-$96,500.9 1-was a
Medicare write-off 4 2 and not part of Baxter's reasonable value of medical
services.4 3 Since this portion of the bill was not paid by anyone, Crozer

35. As a general matter, subrogation rights sometimes allow for insurers to recoup
funds they have paid when an insured recovers twice for injuries. See discussion infra
Part II.C.2.
36. Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786 (Pa. 2001).
37. Id. at 787.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id
41. Id.
42. As a voluntary participant in the Medicare program, Crozer accepted $12,167.40
as full and complete payment for Baxter's medical bills. Id. at 789. The difference
between the billed and paid amounts, referred to as a "write-off' or "set-off," was
forgiven per the contractual agreement between Crozer and Medicare. While this
Comment will not delve into the subject of Medicare write-offs, for a detailed discussion
of write-offs and their intersection with the collateral source rule see Michael W.
Cromwell, Comment, Cutting the Fat Out of Health-Care Costs: Why Medicare and
Medicaid Write-Offs Should Not Be Recoverable Under Oklahoma's Collateral Source
Rule, 62 OKLA. L. REv. 585, 594-99 (2010).
43. Moorhead, 765 A.2d at 791.
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argued, Baxter should not be able to recover it.44 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ultimately held that Baxter was entitled to only the
amount actually paid by Medicare, and thus, the $96,500.91 difference
between the billed amount and the amount paid by Medicare was not part
of the "reasonable value" of her medical expenses. 45
This decision was significant with regard to the collateral source
rule because the court found there were no collateral source implications
with reducing Baxter's past medical expenses.46 Instead, the court noted
"the collateral source rule does not apply to the illusory 'charge' of
$96,500.91 since that amount was not paid by any collateral source."4 7
The Moorhead decision represented an important first step toward fair
compensation for medical malpractice claims in Pennsylvania. After this
case, plaintiffs were barred from collecting the windfall difference
between billed medical expenses and the amount actually paid by
insurers.48 As was the case in Moorhead, there can be a substantial
difference between the amount billed for medical services and the
amount actually paid by a collateral source.49
After Moorhead, numerous lingering issues remained. Moorhead
did not discuss whether past medical expenses paid for by a private
insurer would be subject to a similar write-off.50

The Pennsylvania

General Assembly addressed this issue with the enactment of the
MCARE Act, which essentially precluded plaintiffs from recovering past
medical expenses paid by a private insurer.51
Also, Moorhead's
application to future medical expenses was unclear. This issue remains

44. Id at 788.
45. Id at 791.
46. Id. at 790; cf Rose v. Via Christi Health Sys., 78 P.3d 798, 806 (Kan. 2003)
(holding that the collateral source rule does apply to the written-off portion of a plaintiff's
medical bills when the plaintiff is insured through Medicare).
47. Moorhead, 765 A.2d at 791.
48. Id; see also Watts v. Hollock, No. 3:10cv92, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139166, at
*29 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2011).
49. See Cromwell, supra note 42, at 596 (noting that Medicare and Medicaid will
typically pay about one-third of the amount billed by providers). See also George A.
Nation, Determiningthe Fairand Reasonable Value of Medical Services: The Affordable
Care Act, Government Insurers, PrivateInsurers and UninsuredPatients, 65 BAYLOR L.
REv. 425, 427-30 (2013) (discussing how hospitals inflate the cost of services in their
chargemaster, an extensive price list, with the expectation that such charges will be
negotiated prior to payment).
50. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricingof U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a
Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 61 (2006) (noting that payments from private health
insurers account for about one-third of hospitals' net revenues, and such companies often
have billed charges discounted 50 percent or more).
51. See MCARE Act discussion infra Part II.C.
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unresolved, but this Comment argues in Part III that future medical
expenses should be subject to similar write-offs. 2
C.

Responding to a MedicalMalpractice Crisis-The MCARE
Act
1.

Passing the MCARE Act

In 2002, Pennsylvania was arguably in the midst of a medical
Doctors faced increasingly high medical
malpractice crisis.
malpractice insurance premiums, which forced many to leave the
Commonwealth and practice elsewhere.54 In response to this crisis, and
in furtherance of a public policy to reduce malpractice insurance rates,55
the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the MCARE Act in 2002.56
The MCARE Act created an independent state agency that, among
other things,57 established a patient compensation fund within the
Commonwealth Treasury." The MCARE Fund, 59 as it came to be
known, pays medical malpractice claims against providers who
participate in the MCARE Fund after the providers' primary insurance
coverage is exhausted. 60 To pay for the operation of the Fund and

52. See infra Part III.D.
53. See Kristen R. Salvatore, Comment, Taking Pennsylvania Off Life Support: A
Systems-Based Approach to Resolving Pennsylvania's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 109

PENN ST. L. REv. 363, 363-77 (2004).
54. Id at 363.
55. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1303.102(2)-(3) (2014)("Access to a full spectrum of hospital services and to
highly trained physicians in all specialties must be available across this
Commonwealth ... [and t]o maintain this system, medical professional liability insurance
has to be obtainable at an affordable and reasonable cost in every geographic region of
this Commonwealth.").
56. Id. §§ 1303.101-910; see also Hosp. & Health Sys. Ass'n of Pa. v. Pennsylvania,
77 A.3d 587, 603 (Pa. 2013) ("MCARE comprises social legislation specifically
designed . . to ensure that Pennsylvania citizens have access to the care they need by
incentivizing health care professionals to stay in Pennsylvania, or move to Pennsylvania,
and fulfill those needs.").
57. See Salvatore, supra note 53, at 375-76 (discussing the General Assembly's
concerted effort to reduce and eliminate medical errors by implementing heightened
institutional oversight of health care providers and creating the Patient Safety Authority).
58. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.712(a). The MCARE Fund is established within the
State Treasury, but the administration of the MCARE Fund is controlled by the Insurance
Department. Id. § 1303.713(a).
59. Id. § 1303.712(a).
60. Currently, the primary insurance limit for health care providers is $500,000 per
occurrence and $1,000,000 in the annual aggregate. Id. § 1303.71 l(d)(2)(i). Hospitals
must carry a primary policy limit of $500,000 per occurrence and $2,500,000 in the
annual aggregate. Id. § 1303.711(d)(2)(iii).
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administration of claims, providers pay a mandatory annual assessment, 61
much like an insurance premium. The Fund's purpose is to lessen the
burden of medical malpractice liability insurance costs, thereby keeping
physicians in the Commonwealth.62
2.

The MCARE Act's Effect on the Collateral Source Rule and
Subrogation

Some scholars have suggested that the common law collateral
source rule persists largely because of an insurer's ability to subrogate
funds paid to a plaintiff for past medical expenses.63 Such a system
prevents a plaintiffs "double recovery" because an insurer will step in to
assert its right to be repaid for these medical expenses when the plaintiff
is paid twice. 64 In passing the MCARE Act, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly amended both the common law collateral source rule and
subrogation rights in medical malpractice actions.65
However, in
amending the subrogation rules in medical malpractice actions, the
MCARE Act falls short, at least in part, of prohibiting a plaintiffs
double recovery. 6 In order to understand the MCARE Act's failings in
this regard, it is necessary to first examine the full breadth of the changes
created by the MCARE Act.
a.

Past Medical Expenses

In addition to creating the MCARE Fund, the MCARE Act also
dramatically changed the application of the collateral source rule in
medical malpractice lawsuits. 67 The more defendant-friendly rule
established by the MCARE Act states that a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action is barred from recovering past medical expenses or
lost wages if private or public health insurance covered those expenses. 68
61. Id. § 1303.712(d). Prior to June of 2011, additional funding for the MCARE
Fund was also obtained through the imposition of surcharges related to moving
violations. See id. § 1303.712(m) (2011) (repealed 2011).
62. See Pa. Med. Soc'y v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 39 A.3d 267, 271 (Pa. 2012).
63. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 5, at 987-88 (discussing how the collateral source
rule has persisted in some ways because of an insurer's ability to recover its interests
from the plaintiff's award).
64. Typically, an insurer can assert its rights to compensation for a plaintiffs
medical expenses when the insurer has already paid for these expenses. See, e.g., Jacobs
v. Ne. Corp., 206 A.2d 49, 53 (Pa. 1965) (discussing the basic tenants of subrogation).
65. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.508(a) (2014) (amending the collateral source rule);
40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.508(c) (amending subrogation rights for past medical
expenses).
66. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
67. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.508(a) (2014).
68. Id.
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However, the Act does carve out a large exception for public benefits
paid with a federal right of reimbursement, indicating that these benefits
are not covered by the new iteration of the collateral source rule.69
Accordingly, a plaintiff could recover for medical costs covered by a
public insurer, but such a recovery would be limited to the amount
actually paid by the public insurer under the Moorheaddecision. 70
For example, because Medicaid includes a statutory right of
reimbursement,71 Medicaid will exercise its subrogation rights over any
funds paid to the plaintiff for billed medical expenses. 2 While
government-insured plaintiffs are technically compensated twice for their
past medical expenses-once by the insurance carrier and once by the
defendant-the government insurance carrier, i.e. Medicaid, will pursue
the plaintiff for reimbursement. 73 In effect, the MCARE Act's new
application of the collateral source rule precludes a plaintiffs double
recovery for past medical bills paid by a government-sponsored
insurance plan because of the government's subrogation rights to the
plaintiff s second recovery. 74
The MCARE Act also ushered in another important change 7 5 to the
medical malpractice landscape-the inability of a private insurer to

69. Id. § 1303.508(d)(4).
70. Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786 (Pa. 2001); see also supra
Part II.B.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii)(2015).
72. ERISA, which regulates employer-sponsored health care plans, is another federal
program that is occasionally involved in a plaintiffs health care, and it typically has a
reimbursement right. Unlike Medicare or Medicaid, this reimbursement right is not
found within the statute itself but is found within the contractual language of most
qualified plans. See Amber M. Anstine, Comment, ERISA Qualified Subrogation Liens:
Should They be Reduced to Reflect a Pro Rata Share of Attorney Fees?, 104 DICK. L.
REv. 359, 360 (2000).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii).
74. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.508(d)(4).
75. Beyond changes to the collateral source rule and subrogation, the MCARE Act
also introduced a periodic payment provision codified at 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1303.509(b)(2) (2014). Periodic payment provisions are a common medical
malpractice tort reform that allows for a defendant to periodically pay a plaintiffs future
medical expenses over the course of the plaintiffs life. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort
Reform's Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55
UCLA L. REv. 905, 935 (2008). If the plaintiff died before the entirety of the judgment
was paid, the defendant would not be liable for the remainder. Id. This Comment will
not focus on periodic payment provisions or their effectiveness, but for a detailed
discussion of periodic payment provisions and their effect on medical malpractice
settlements, see Ronen Avraham, CurrentResearch on Medical MalpracticeLiability:An
Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice Settlement
Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 183 (2007).
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exercise its subrogation right for medical expenses. 76 This change is
particularly important because, unlike a public insurer such as Medicare
or Medicaid, a private insurer will not be able to recoup any money a
defendant pays to cover a plaintiffs past medical expenses. 7 However,
a private insurer's inability to subrogate generally aligns with Section
1303.508(a) of the MCARE Act, which states that a medical malpractice
plaintiff may not recover for past expenses paid for by a private insurer. 8
Thus, the Pennsylvania General Assembly made sure that privately
insured plaintiffs, just like publicly insured plaintiffs, could not recover
their past medical costs twice. In the case of a publicly insured plaintiff,
double recovery is not possible because of the government's subrogation
rights.7 9 In the case of a privately insured plaintiff, the MCARE Act
precludes recovery from a defendant of past medical expenses covered
by private insurance.o
Although these MCARE Act provisions make clear the General
Assembly's intent to prohibit plaintiffs from obtaining double recoveries
for past medical costs, no language exists in the MCARE Act to prevent
double recovery offuture medical expenses. This silence is problematic
for a number of reasons, most importantly because future medical
expenses can account for some of the largest expenditures in medical
malpractice lawsuits.8 1 Additionally, the MCARE Act was signed into
law well before the ACA took effect; thus, the drafters of the MCARE
Act likely did not contemplate near-universal health care coverage or its
potential effect on future medical damages. Accordingly, the everincreasing percentage of insured Pennsylvanians is incongruent with the
reality that the MCARE Act allows double recoveries of future medical
expenses.
b.

Future Medical Expenses

Unlike past medical expenses, which can be readily calculated and
paid by looking at a plaintiffs medical bills or a public insurer's billing
rate, future medical damages are much more difficult to accurately
76.

40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.508(c) ("[T]here shall be no right of subrogation or

reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to a public or private benefit

covered in subsection (a).").
77. Id.
78. Id. § 1303.508(a).
79. Id. § 1303.508(d)(4).
80. Id. § 1303.508(c).
81. See Sarah R. Levin, Comment, The Medical Malpractice System and the
Payment of Future Medical Damages: On Life Support Elsewhere, Resuscitated in

Louisiana, 68 LA. L. REv. 955, 958-59 (2008) (noting that the typical driving force
behind large medical malpractice verdicts is economic damages, including future medical
costs).
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ascertain.82 Typically calculated by a life care planner, these damages
are mere estimates of the medical care a plaintiff will likely need for the
rest of his or her life. Future medical costs can include services such as
future doctor visits, prescription expenses, long-term care, in-house
nursing, transportation, or a myriad of other medical needs.84 Such costs
can amount to huge sums.
These future medical expenses raise a significant question for
doctors and liability insurers alike. Should a defendant be liable to a
plaintiff for an enormous amount of future medical damages when the
ACA requires the plaintiff carry health insurance that covers many of
these costs? The question becomes even more compelling when
considering that the ACA prohibits insurance carriers from denying
health care coverage because of preexisting medical conditions.85 Now,
even a previously uninsured plaintiff may obtain affordable insurance
after his or her injury.
Further complicating this situation are the insurers' subrogation
rights. Pursuant to the MCARE Act, health insurance companies are not
able to assert their subrogation rights over a plaintiffs medical
malpractice award for past medical expenses, but there is no mention of
an insurer's ability to subrogate future medical expenses.87 The ACA,
meanwhile, provides no subrogation provision for insurers.88 Thus, for
future medical expenses, the defendant pays the plaintiff after an award
or settlement, and the insurance carrier periodically pays the plaintiffs
medical bills without an ability to subrogate.89 Such an arrangement
perpetuates double recoveries for plaintiffs, particularly for those
plaintiffs with private health insurance. 90

82. See Watts v. Hollock, No. 3:10cv92, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139166, at *30
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2011) ("[T]he precise amount of future medical expenses are [sic]
inherently speculative.").
83. See Deeds v. Univ. of Pa. Med. Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015) ("A certified life care planner reviews medical records and bills to formulate an
expert opinion projecting the future medical costs of an individual over her lifetime.").
84. See, e.g., Reges v Nallathambi, No. 1199 WDA 2012, 2013 Pa. Super Unpub.
LEXIS 2088, at *3-4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2013) (discussing various types of future
medical expenses required by a plaintiff in medical malpractice suits).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2010).
86. Id.
87. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.508(c) (2014).
88. See Todd, supra note 5, at 982 n.131.
89. See infra Part III.
90. See id.
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Failureto Extend Moorheadto Future Medical Expenses: Cleaver
v. United States

Unfortunately, given their interrelatedness, the aforementioned
concerns regarding future medical expenses manifest in even relatively
straightforward cases. Take, for example, a patient who seeks treatment
at a hospital after complaints involving his urinary tract. 91 The doctor
treating the patient fails to recognize the signs and symptoms of kidney
disease, and the delay in treatment causes the patient irrevocable kidney
damage such that the patient will need a kidney transplant in the future. 92
The patient will have significant future medical expenses related to his
damaged kidney.93 Notably, however, the patient is insured through
Medicare.94 The Moorhead court explained that any past medical
expenses should be paid at the billing rate of the government-sponsored
insurance provider; 9 5 should future medical expenses be paid at the same
rate? This was the question addressed by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Cleaver v. United States.96
1.

Case Background

The facts of the above example were taken from the Cleaver case.
As discussed above, the plaintiff in Cleaver was injured as the result of
the doctor's failure to diagnose a kidney condition.97 The plaintiff sued
his provider for the cost of future medical expenses related to his
injury. 98 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to
require that plaintiffs past and future medical expenses be measured
using Medicare billing rates.99 The defendant argued that because the
plaintiff was approved for Medicare based on his disability, and because
the plaintiff contended he would be disabled for the rest of his life, then
Medicare billing rates should be applied to future medical expenses as
well. 100

91.
2012).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
2012).
97.
98.
99.
100.

Cleaver v. United States, No. 08-425, 2012 WL 912729 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 15,
Id. at *1.
Id at *2.
Id.
Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. 2001).
Cleaver v. United States, No. 08-425, 2012 WL 912729 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 15,
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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The plaintiff, however, noted that the Moorhead decision applied
only to the issue of past medical expenses."0 ' In making this argument,
the plaintiff explained that there was no guarantee that Medicare would
insure him for the rest of his life, so using Medicare billing rates as the
102
reasonable value of his medical expenses was misplaced.
In its analysis, the Cleaver court briefly noted that the Moorhead
decision was dispositive with regard to past medical expenses; such
expenses are recovered at the Medicare billing rate as long as the health
care provider accepts this rate. 103 However, the court declined to adopt
the same standard for future medical expenses, noting that "[t]his
jurisdiction has never extended Moorhead's holding and rationale to
04
The
encompass recovery of damages for future medical expenses."'1
court explained as part of its rationale that there was no guarantee that
Medicare would exist in perpetuity.'0o Accordingly, the defendant's
motion in limine to exclude future medical costs beyond the Medicare
billing rate was denied.106
The Cleaver court's refusal to extend Moorhead's holding to future
medical expenses created a serious dilemma after the introduction of the
ACA. Should a defendant be forced to pay medical costs to a plaintiff
07
Or, should the tortfeasor
who will already be covered by insurance?l
be liable for the amount of harm caused, consistent with the collateral
source rule?os
III. ANALYSIS

Currently, Pennsylvania's collateral source rule successfully
09
Under the
prohibits double recoveries for past medical expenses.'
MCARE Act, privately insured plaintiffs may not collect past medical

101. Id at *3.

102. Id. at *3. This argument is often cited when discussing Medicare or Medicaid
billing rates as applied to future medical expenses. See, e.g., Watts v. Hollock, No.
3:10cv92, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139166, at *30 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2011) ("Fairness and
public policy dictate that the burden of any risk regarding future medical costs or changes
in insurance contribution rates should fall on the defendants not the plaintiffs.")
103. Cleaver, 2012 WL 912729, at *2. The court also cited to cases where defendants
argued to extend Moorhead's holding to future medical expenses in circumstances
outside the realm of medical malpractice. Id.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
106. Id
107. See Levenson, supra note 5, at 931 (discussing the argument that the primary
purpose of tort law is fair compensation to the victim and that the collateral source rule
does not further this purpose).
108. Id. at 928-29 (discussing the argument that deterrence is a primary purpose of
tort law and the collateral source rule accomplishes this purpose).
109. See supra Part II.C.2.a.

544

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:2

expenses covered by their health insurance.110 Likewise, publicly
insured plaintiffs can collect for past medical expenses covered by their
insurance, but this double recovery is extinguished when the public
insurer exercises its right of subrogation.111 However, when it comes to
future medical expenses, the MCARE Act is lacking in its ability to stop
plaintiffs' double recoveries. This double recovery is antithetical to
Pennsylvania's public policy of keeping doctors' medical liability
insurance rates low. 112 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
or judiciary is warranted in amending the means by which plaintiffs
recover future medical expenses in medical malpractice lawsuits.
A.

Why Amending Pennsylvania'sCollateralSource Rule in Medical
MalpracticeActions is Practical

Admittedly, there are strong countervailing public policies against
offsetting future medical expenses. For instance, a common argument
against abrogating the collateral source rule is that it is unfair for the
tortfeasor-in this case, a doctor-to benefit from the plaintiffs
insurance coverage.113
Additionally, many scholars point to the
deterrence value that the collateral source rule provides to tortfeasors as a
reason for its continued existence. 114 Patients may be safer in a legal
landscape that deters harmful or negligent conduct.' 15 Although these
public policies make sense in theory, they do not accomplish their goals
in practice. Physicians, by and large, do not pay out-of-pocket for the
110. See id.
111. See id
112. See Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 1303.102(2)-(3) (2014). While not geared specifically towards medical malpractice,
another Pennsylvania statute that helped doctors reduce large awards is found in
Pennsylvania's Fair Share Act, codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102(a.1)(1) (2014).
The Fair Share Act amended Pennsylvania's comparative negligence scheme. Id. In a
case involving multiple tortfeasors, the new law ended the requirement that financially
solvent co-defendants make the plaintiff whole if other co-defendants could not pay their
share. See William J. Ricci & Thomas Finarelli, Understanding the "New Reality" of
Pennsylvania'sFairShare Act, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES 6215 (2012) (LEXIS) (discussing
Fair Share Act's applicability to medical malpractice proceedings).
113. See, e.g., Johnson v. Beane, 664 A.2d 90, 100 (Pa. 1995) ("The principle behind
the collateral source rule is that it is better for the wronged plaintiff to receive a potential
windfall than for a tortfeasor to be relieved of responsibility for the wrong."); J. Zachary
Balasko, A Return to Reasonability: Modifying the Collateral Source Rule in Light of
Artificially Inflated DamageAwards, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 16, 21 (2015) ("[T]he rule
validates a windfall in favor of the plaintiff to prevent a windfall in favor of the
defendant.").
114. See, e.g., Ann S. Levin, Comment, The Fate of the CollateralSource Rule After
HealthcareReform, 60 UCLA L. REv. 736, 751-52 (2013) (noting that one justification
for the collateral source rule is that it may increase deterrence for tortfeasors).
115. See id.
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harm that they cause to patients. 1 16 Rather, plaintiffs' awards or
settlements are paid by liability insurance carriers, which at least
partially dampens any deterrence value the collateral source rule
creates.! 17

Moreover, the historical rationale for the collateral source rule-that
the rule "prevent[s] a wrongdoer from taking advantage of the fortuitous
existence of a collateral remedy"'"-is now a relic of history. Today, an
11 9 and
increasing number of individuals are insured thanks to the ACA
the Health Insurance Exchanges. 12 0 Additionally, the ACA expanded
Medicaid in most states, meaning even more citizens are being granted
1
access to quality, affordable health care.12 The individual mandate
component of the ACA assures that a plaintiffs status as insured is not
22
fortuitous; it is now legally required.1
With so many insured plaintiffs in medical malpractice lawsuits and
no ability to stop plaintiffs from recovering twice for future medical
expenses, the parties who bear the brunt of these extra payments are
medical liability insurance carriers and, by extension through higher
123
Increasing medical
insurance premiums, the doctors themselves.

116. See Kathryn Zeiler, Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis or Patient
Compensation Crisis?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 691 (2010) (noting that in a Texas study,
only 1.5 percent of large payout claims had payments above a physician's primary
liability policy limit).
117. See Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern
Theories of Tort Law and a Proposalfor PracticalApplication, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
1075, 1091 (1997) (noting the argument that the prevalence of liability insurance may
"create a buffer between the defendant and his tort liability obligations .... ").
118. Beechwoods Flying Serv., Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 476 A.2d 350,
353 (Pa. 1984).
119.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., Nationwide Nearly 11.7 Million

Consumers are Enrolled in 2015 Health Insurance Marketplace Coverage (March 10,
2015), http://bit.ly/1ERGWsm.
Health Insurance Exchanges, often called
120. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(A).
Insurance Marketplaces, are state-run entities that "facilitate[] the purchase of qualified
health plans[.]" Id.
121. Initially, the Supreme Court struck down the ACA's provision that required
states to expand Medicaid to all non-elderly citizens with incomes below 133 percent of
poverty line. See Nat'l Fed'n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-09 (2012).
However, states still retained the ability to voluntarily expand Medicaid, as was
suggested by the federal government. Id. at 2607. But see, e.g., Last Week Tonight with
John Oliver (HBO television broadcast Nov. 1, 2015), http://itsh.bo/2cnoDkg (noting that
20 states have not expanded Medicaid despite the federal government paying no less than
90 percent of the expansion).
122. I.R.C. § 5000A (2010)
123. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE
FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, GAO-03-702 (2003),

("GAO found that losses on medical
http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/238724.pdf
malpractice claims - which make up the largest part of insurers' costs - appear to be
the primary driver of rate increases in the long run.").
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liability insurance rates will continue to have a detrimental impact on
doctors'
abilities to continue practicing medicine in the
Commonwealth. 12 4 With Pennsylvania's clear public policy promoting
the retention of skilled doctors and the availability of quality health
care, 125 the Pennsylvania General Assembly should amend the collateral
source rule to prohibit plaintiffs in medical malpractice lawsuits from
collecting their future medical costs twice.
Although the introduction of the ACA has created a predicament in
the medical malpractice arena, means exist to remedy the problem and
create greater equity for plaintiffs and defendants.
The following
sections of this Comment will discuss the options available to the
General Assembly to resolve medical malpractice claims in an equitable
manner, including: 1) allowing the introduction of evidence pertaining
to the plaintiffs insurance coverage at trial, thereby affecting the
collateral source rule and its role as an evidentiary rule; 12 6 2) abrogating
the collateral source rule at the verdict stage, as has been done in New
York; 127 or 3) extending the Moorhead holding to future medical
expenses to allow for a publicly insured plaintiffs to recover only the
billing rates related to their medical expenses. 12 8 All three systems
accomplish the same two goals. First, these systems ensure that
plaintiffs are compensated fairly for their medical bills. 12 9 Second, they
lessen the burden on the physicians and the physicians' liability insurers
such that claim payments and malpractice premiums will decrease. 13 0
B.

Abrogating the CollateralSource Rule and Allowing the Jury to
FairlyDecide Plaintifs'Damages

One way that the Pennsylvania General Assembly can preclude
double recoveries by plaintiffs in medical malpractice lawsuits is to
allow juries to hear evidence regarding a plaintiffs insurance
coverage. 131 Such a system would eliminate the collateral source rule's
function as a rule of evidence. 13 2 In this system, a defendant physician
124. See Salvatore, supra note 53, at 363 (noting that some doctors chose to leave
Pennsylvania due to rising medical liability insurance rates).
125. See Medical Care Availability and Reduction of
Error (MCARE) Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1303.102(2)-(3)(2014).
126. See infra Part III.B.
127. See infra Part III.C.
128. See infra Part III.D.
129. See infra Part III.B-D.
130. See id.
131. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-545 (2016).
132. See Levenson supra note 5, at 940-41 (discussing the collateral source rule as
both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages). Viewed as a rule of evidence, the
collateral source rule prevents a defendant from introducing evidence of a plaintiffs

A
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could introduce evidence regarding the plaintiffs public or private health
insurance (or lack thereof) so that the jury could make an informed
This approach has been adopted -in
decision regarding damages.
Alabama, pursuant to the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987.133
Alabama's abrogation of the collateral source rule allows a
defendant to introduce evidence of a "plaintiffs medical or hospital
4
expenses [that] have been or will be paid or reimbursed." 13 Alabama's
statute is incredibly broad, and if such a statute were adopted in
Pennsylvania, it would encompass all plaintiffs in Pennsylvania medical
malpractice cases. 13 5 Importantly, a provision in the Alabama statute
allows plaintiffs to introduce evidence of "the cost of obtaining
36
This
reimbursement or payment of medical or hospital expenses."l
provision also permits plaintiffs to indicate the cost at which they
acquired their insurance. Thus, plaintiffs are able to provide to the jury
the costs of their premiums, co-payments, and deductibles that were paid
to obtain care.137
Interestingly, the Alabama statute does not require the jury or the
court to offset economic damages by the amount of collateral source
payments. 13 8 In fact, a jury is within its discretion to completely
disregard evidence of a plaintiffs insurance and award damages that
139
have already been paid by the plaintiffs health insurance carrier.
Alabama courts have grappled with the constitutionality of this
insurance at trial due to the perceived prejudicial impact such insurance coverage may
have on the plaintiff. Id. at 940-42. Conversely, when viewed as a rule of damages, the
collateral source rule blocks insurance information from evidence under the theory that a
defendant should not benefit from a plaintiff obtaining insurance prior to a loss. Richard
C. Ausness, An Insurance-BasedCompensation System for Product-RelatedInjuries, 58
U. PITT. L. REv. 669, 708 (1997).
133. ALA. CODE § 6-5-545. Numerous other states have also passed similar reforms
to the collateral source rule. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12-565(a) (2015) (allowing
evidence of a plaintiffs health insurance in medical malpractice actions); ARiz. REV.

§ 12-565(A) (2015) (allowing the evidentiary admission of insurance
benefits, except those with a right of subrogation); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1(a) (2015)
(allowing the defendant to introduce evidence of a plaintiff's insurance in medical
malpractice lawsuits, except insurance with a right of subrogation).
STAT. ANN.

§ 6-5-545(a).

134.

ALA. CODE

137.

2-40 MICHAEL L. ROBERTS, ALABAMA TORT LAW

135. Although if a plaintiff did not include damages for medical expenses, no
collateral source rule concerns would arise.
136. ALA. CODE § 6-5-545(a).

§

40.12 (6th ed. 2015)

(LEXIS).
138. See Benjamin B. Coulter, No Longer as Good as Dead: The Continued Revival
of Alabama's Medical and Hospital Expense Exception to the Collateral Source Rule a
Decade After Marsh, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 299, 316-17 (2011) (recommending that the
Alabama Legislature amend the statute to make clearer how courts should apply the

provision).
139. See id. at 317.
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provision,140 and there are certainly concerns raised when a jury is tasked

with such a complicated discretionary function-namely, jury confusion
and inconsistent results.1 4 1 Admittedly, the system is far from perfect. A
defendant may provide ironclad proof of a plaintiffs collateral benefits
but have this evidence disregarded or misapplied by a jury when
calculating damages.1 42
Despite these concerns, the Alabama system still assures that
victims of medical negligence are compensated fairly for their injuries,
and it also typically prevents plaintiffs from obtaining windfall double
recoveries of past and future medical expenses. If Pennsylvania were to
adopt a comparable statute allowing evidence of collateral sources to be
introduced at trial, the General Assembly should require the jury to
deduct collateral source payments from the allocation for past and future
medical expenses. Doing so would allay any concerns of jury confusion
and uniformly apply the provision to all medical malpractice cases.
Abrogating the CollateralSource Rule at the Post-Verdict Stage
An Examination ofN.Y C.P.L.R. § 4545(a)

-

C.

Whereas the Alabama collateral source statute vests considerable,
and perhaps excessive, discretion with the jury to potentially offset
payments from collateral sources, the New York statute assigns this task
to the court in a post-verdict hearing.1 43 New York's decision to allow a
judge to deduct payments from past or future collateral sources from the
verdict assuages the two concerns created with the Alabama system:
jury confusion and inconsistent verdicts.1 4 4 Additionally, the New York
system requires the court to offset verdicts based on sufficient evidence

140. American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahy, 681 So. 2d 1337, 1347 (Ala. 1996)
(noting that a "standaidless submission to the jury" of damages and collateral source
evidence would violate the Alabama Constitution's due process provision), overruled by
Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000).
141. See Todd, supra note 5, at 976.
142. See, e.g., Killian v. Meiser, 792 F.Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D. Ala. 1992) ("[Such an
instruction to the jury] is tantamount to telling the jury that it can, with impunity, reduce
any justifiable verdict by the amount of money plaintiff may receive from a collateral
source, but that it need not do so, or, for that matter may punish a greedy plaintiff and
give him nothing in an otherwise meritorious case.").
143. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545 (Consol. 2015). Other states utilize a system similar
in nature to New York's system. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1606 (2015)("Evidence of
payment by collateral sources [without a right of subrogation] is admissible to the court
after the finder of fact has rendered an award."); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.6303(1)(2)(2015) ("[I]f the court determines that all or part of the plaintiff's expense or loss has
been paid or is payable by a collateral source, the court shall reduce that portion of the
judgment which represents damages paid or payable by a collateral source .....
144. See Todd, supra note 5, at 976.
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of the collateral source, which achieves the ultimate goal of eliminating
plaintiffs' double recoveries. 145
In New York civil actions, evidence of collateral source
payments-such as health insurance-is admissible only for the court to
determine whether the plaintiff "was or will, with reasonable certainty,
be replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part, from any collateral
Notably, collateral sources with statutory rights of
source." 146
reimbursement, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and ERISA, are outside of
the New York system's purview.147 However, because the ACA is
leading to more plaintiffs' being insured through private carriers, New
148
York's statute is affecting an increasing amount of its citizens.
Moreover, the New York statute's language indicates that collateral
14 9
Rather, the trial is
source evidence is not admissible during trial.
were applicable. 5 0
rule
source
collateral
law
common
the
if
as
completed
If a verdict is reached in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant must request
151
At
a separate collateral source hearing prior to the entry of judgment.
this hearing, the defendant must present some competent evidence that
the plaintiff was or will be compensated for the loss from a collateral
source. 15 2
During the collateral source hearing, the New York statute requires
that the defendant show with reasonable certainty that a collateral source
has compensated, or will compensate, the plaintiff for the damages that
were awarded at trial.1 3 New York courts have interpreted this
requirement to mean that a defendant must show that it is highly
probable the plaintiff will have continued eligibility of coverage or
benefits. 154

145. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545(a) ("If the court finds that any such cost or expense was or
will, with reasonable certainty, be replaced or indemnified from any such collateral
source, it shall reduce the amount of the award by such finding.").
146. Id.
147. Id. However, as discussed previously in Part II.C.2.a., subrogation rights of the
public insurer typically quell concerns for double recoveries by plaintiffs.
148. See Diamond, supra note 33.
149. See, e.g., Young v. Knickerbocker Arena, 722 N.Y.S.2d 596, 599 (N.Y. App.
Div., 2001) ("The relevant rule is that evidence that [an] alleged tort-feasor carries
liability insurance is not admissible as potentially prejudicial.") (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Allen v. Harrington, 550 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)).
150. See id.
151. Firmes v. Chase Manhattan Auto. Fin. Corp., 852 N.Y.S.2d 148, 159 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) ("It has been held that an application for a collateral source hearing may be
timely made any time before the judgment is entered.")
152. See id. at 161 (noting that the evidentiary burden for obtaining a collateral source
hearing is less than the burden to secure a setoff of damages during the hearing).
153. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545(a).
154. Young, 722 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
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To date, New York courts have not determined whether this "high
probability" standard is met when evidence of a plaintiffs insurance
through the ACA is introduced at a collateral source hearing. However,
in Peralta v. Quintero,5 5 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the defendant had met the
burden to secure a collateral source hearing when he subpoenaed
Medicaid records and contended the plaintiff could obtain coverage
through the ACA. 15 6 The court noted that such evidence may not have
been sufficient for the defendant to actually obtain a setoff of any
damages, but the evidence was sufficient to grant the hearing.1 17
While New York courts continue to grapple with the weight they
place on ACA coverage in securing collateral source hearings and
offsetting verdicts, this system still presents many advantages over the
Alabama system and the current Pennsylvania system. Unlike the
Alabama system, where the jury may or may not offset damages, the
New York scheme requires the court to offset a plaintiff s damages if the
defendant can show a "high probability" that the plaintiff had or will
have collateral sources pay for damages incurred.' 58 From a practical
standpoint, New York's statute is superior to Alabama's in that the
complicated process of determining what damages should be offset, as
well as what coverage is likely to exist in the future, is left for the court
to decide.1 5 9 Thus, the serious concerns of jury confusion and
inconsistent results are eliminated.160 Moreover, and perhaps most
importantly, New York's collateral source rule statute requires the court
to offset damages awarded to a plaintiff who has a high probability of
benefitting from collateral source payments. 6 1
New York's statute is also advantageous because it is inherently fair
for a number of reasons. First, the statute prevents double recoveries that
the collateral source rule has enabled for over a century.1 62 Second, the
"high probability" requirement protects plaintiffs whose insurance
coverage may not exist in perpetuity because judges will offset future
economic damages only when it is likely the plaintiff will be able to take

155. Peralta v. Quintero, 12cv3864-FM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18807, at *27-28
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2015).
156. Id.

157.

Id.

158. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545(a).
159. Id.
160. See Todd, supra note 5, at 976 ("A jury's calculation of damages can be made
much easier when the intricacies of collateral benefits are excluded from consideration by
the jury and reserved for consideration by the judge in post-verdict proceedings.").
161. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545(a).
162. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
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advantage of such collateral sources. 1 63 Thus, the New York statute
allays one of the biggest concerns associated with the collateral source
rule-that plaintiffs may be forced to take a setoff when their potential
eligibility for benefits is uncertain. 164 Lastly, if a plaintiffs damages are
offset as a result of a collateral source payment, the plaintiff is entitled to
reimbursement for the preceding two years' worth of premiums, as well
as the projected premium cost of maintaining the coverage in the
future.165 Accordingly, a defendant is not liable for damages that have
already been or will be paid, and the plaintiff is compensated for past and
future insurance premiums to ensure that the necessary coverage exists
for as long as is needed.
D.

Extending the Moorhead Ruling to Future Medical Expenses

While Pennsylvania is free to adopt a statutory scheme similar to
Alabama's or New York's system, to do so would require a legislative
overhaul of the MCARE Act or the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.
Admittedly, to do so would be an arduous task.' 66 The Pennsylvania
judiciary, however, should mitigate the abundance of double recoveries
in medical malpractice lawsuits by extending the Moorhead decisionwhich defined the reasonable value of medical expenses as the amount
actually paid by the insurance provider 67-to include future medical
expenses rather than solely past medical expenses. To do so would
provide fair compensation to plaintiffs based on damages actually
incurred and align with Pennsylvania's existing public policy as evinced
by the MCARE Act.1 68
The Moorheaddecision requires that past medical expenses be paid
based on the amount paid by the insurance provider and not based on
what health care providers billed for their services. 169 The issue before
the court at that time did not include the reasonable value of future
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Cleaver v. United States, No. 08-425, 2012 WL 912729, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 15, 2012).
165. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4545(a).
166. For instance, Pennsylvania's Fair Share Act was initially passed in 2002. 42 PA.
CONs. STAT. § 7102(a.1)(1) (2002). However, the statute was deemed unconstitutional
for procedural reasons in DeWeese v. Weaver, 880 A.2d 54 (Pa. Commw. 2005), af'd
sub nom. DeWeese v. Cortes, 906 A.2d 1193 (Pa. 2006). The statute was finally passed
again, 12 years later, at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (2014).
167. See supra Section II.B.
168. The author is cognizant of the argument that the judiciary's extension of
Moorhead may be tantamount to judicial activism. However, see Christopher Peters,
Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 315-17 (1997) for a discussion
regarding judicial activism and its potential democratic legitimacy, especially when the
judiciary aims to fill legislative gaps.
169. Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. 2001).
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medical expenses and whether such expenses should be subject to a
similar write-off. In Cleaver, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the issue of the reasonable
value of future medical expenses, but it chose not to extend the
Moorheadholding.17 0
Despite the Cleaver decision, the Pennsylvania judiciary still retains
the ability to extend Moorhead, and it should do so for a number of
reasons. Initially, the extension of Moorheadto future medical expenses
is perfectly aligned with Pennsylvania's public policy of retaining skilled
physicians and fostering an environment where medical liability
insurance remains affordable."1 With fewer inflated verdicts due to high
future medical expenses, physicians will be more likely to remain in the
Commonwealth because of lower insurance premiums. 172 When the
collateral source rule is next challenged, the judiciary should also look to
other legislation, such as the Fair Share Act1 73 and recently enacted
apology legislation,17 4 as further evidence of the General Assembly's
intent to lessen the burden of physicians' liability insurance rates.
Moreover, extending Moorhead to future medical expenses is
consistent with the evolving health insurance climate. The ACA has
dramatically increased the percentage of those who carry health
insurance.17 5
Although the common law collateral source rule
historically served its purpose of protecting the fortuitous occasion where
a plaintiff carried insurance, that environment no longer exists.176 The
individual mandate component of the ACA requires that individuals
carry health insurance, and the number of uninsured Americans has
dropped and will likely continue to do so."' Therefore, the perpetuation
of the collateral source rule's application to future medical expenses no
longer coincides with the reality of today's average plaintiff.
Should the judiciary extend Moorhead to include future medical
damages, it would need to determine the fair value of such damages.
The most equitable way to do this is to compensate the plaintiff based on
the plaintiffs maximum annual cost of insurance, including the cost of

170. Cleaver v. United States, No. 08-425, 2012 WL 912729, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
15, 2012).
171. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1303.102(2)-(3)(2014).
172. See Salvatore, supra note 53, at 363.
173. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102(a.1)(1) (2014); see also supra note 112.
174. See Benevolent Gesture Medical Professional Liability Act, 35 PA. STAT. §
10228.3 (2014) (deeming inadmissible any benevolent gestures, i.e. apologies, made by a
health care provider to a patient).
175. See Obama, supra note 32, at E3.
176. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
177. See Diamond, supra note 33.
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premiums, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket costs.178 The court can

readily calculate these costs based on the current maximum payments
established by the Department of Health and Human Services. 179 From
this publicly available information, defendants can prove these costs with
a fair degree of probability.'8s This avenue of compensation is inherently
fairer than the current system because a plaintiffs future damages may
be more or less than initially estimated.18 1 Compensating plaintiffs so
that they may obtain health insurance with no out-of-pocket costs to
cover future medical needs-even those potentially unrelated to the
current suit-assures that plaintiffs are paid no more or no less than
deserved.
Accordingly, extending the Moorhead decision to future medical
damages would allow for an evenhanded resolution to determining a
plaintiffs economic damages. Furthermore, if the judiciary extends the
Moorhead holding to future medical expenses, the extension would be
well within Pennsylvania's clear public policy of maintaining a
flourishing medical services market while lessening the burden that
medical liability insurance premiums place on doctors. 182 For these
reasons, the extension of the Moorhead decision to include future
damages presents the most equitable, and perhaps the most feasible,
means by which Pennsylvania can prevent double recoveries and the
perpetuation of the collateral source rule.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The collateral source rule's persistence in medical malpractice
actions has been undermined by the ACA's passage. The doctrine,
which for over a century has relied on the "fortuitousness" of insurance,
has been subject to many reform attempts. For instance, with regard to
Pennsylvania medical malpractice actions, the General Assembly passed
the MCARE Act, which partially abrogated the collateral source rule for
past medical expenses. Despite these reforms, the collateral source rule

178. See HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg.
10,825 (Feb. 27, 2015) (noting that the maximum out-of-pocket cost for an individual
under the ACA, non-inclusive of premiums, is $6,850).
179. Id.
180. See Wujcik v. Yorktowne Dental Assocs., 701 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. Commw.
1997) ("[T]he law ... requires a plaintiff to produce evidence which establishes, with a
fair degree of probability, a basis for assessing damages.") (citing Shoenenberger v.
Hayman, 465 A.2d 1335, 1339 (Pa. Commw. 1983)).
181. See Watts v. Hollock, No. 3:10cv92, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139166, at *30
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2011) ("[T]he precise amount of future medical expenses are [sic]
inherently speculative.").
182. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1303.102(2)-(3) (2014).
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continues to allow plaintiffs to collect windfall double recoveries for
future medical expenses, an area of damages left largely undisturbed by
the MCARE Act. This double recovery is at odds with Pennsylvania's
public policies of reducing physicians' medical liability premiums and
keeping competent physicians in the Commonwealth.
Some states have attempted to restrict double recoveries of future
damages by allowing either the jury or the court to offset awards where a
plaintiff is likely to be compensated by a collateral source. However,
Pennsylvania's best option to combat the potential for double recoveries
in medical malpractice lawsuits is to extend the Moorhead holding to
future damages. In determining the fair and reasonable value of such
future damages, Pennsylvania courts should award plaintiffs the
maximum out-of-pocket costs for premiums, deductibles, and other costs
of obtaining health insurance through the ACA. This system assures fair
compensation for plaintiffs by preventing double recoveries, and it is
consistent with Pennsylvania's existing goals of fostering a high-quality
healthcare system within the Commonwealth.

